Baltimore bridge container ship

[John Arton]

https://splash247.com/dali-leaves-us...airs-in-china/
The Dali, the ship that brought down the bridge in Baltimore, has left the USA for repairs in china of all places. Must be a bloody cheap yard to travel all that way for what, looking at the picture of her, it's not as if she has suffered too much damage, hull seems intact as do most of the deck.
Rgds
J.A.

[Ivan Cloherty]

Must be one hella ov a cement box in the foc'le to allow her to sail

[James Curry]

The ship was escorted by the US Coast Guard and three tugs as it left Norfolk, Virginia yesterday, carrying no cargo. Its journey to China is expected to take 46 days.

Bit like bolting the stable door after the horse has bolted is it not, 3 escort tugs!!!

[Des Taff Jenkins]

I agree, even two tugs could have prevented the accident, perhaps the shipping Company should counter sue.
Des

[happy daze john in oz]

Soi there we are back to steel made in China.

[Peter Gill]

The Owners and operators are now seeking to limit their liability in the Maryland Court.
See the introsuction to the US Govt claim and story below. The full Court document is so one-sided as to be laughable.

The United States of America respectfully files this claim and answer to the complaint of
Petitioners Grace Ocean Private Limited (“Grace Ocean”), as owner of the Motor Vessel
(“M/V”) DALI, and Synergy Marine Pte Ltd (“Synergy”), as the technical manager of the M/V
DALI.
INTRODUCTION
1. On March 26, 2024, the containership M/V DALI crashed into and toppled the Francis
Scott Key Bridge. Tragically, this event took the lives of six construction workers on the bridge
and injured two others. In addition, the wreck of the DALI and the remnants of the Francis Scott
Key Bridge obstructed the Fort McHenry Channel, blocking access to the Port of Baltimore and
severing key links in the Nation’s transportation and defense infrastructure. As a result of the
disaster, the United States incurred more than $100,000,000 in losses and response costs in the
course of clearing the wreck and bridge debris from the navigable channel to reopen the Port of
Baltimore.

2. This tragedy was entirely avoidable. The electrical and mechanical systems on the DALI
were improperly maintained and configured in a way that violated safety regulations and norms
for international shipping. These problems precipitated a power loss and then a cascading series
of failures that culminated in the allision. As events unfolded, and because of the unseaworthy
condition of the ship, none of the four means available to help control the DALI—her propeller,
rudder, anchor, or bow thruster—worked when they were needed to avert or even mitigate this
disaster.
3. Shortly after midnight, a Maryland-licensed pilot boarded the DALI to guide the ship
from Baltimore’s Seagirt Marine Terminal to the Chesapeake Bay. After the captain assured the
pilot that the ship was in good working order, the pilot directed the DALI’s movements into the
Fort McHenry Channel. As the vessel approached the bridge, while only about four minutes
from it, the ship lost electrical power when circuit breakers for the number 1 step-down
transformer tripped open.
4. The DALI’s number 1 step-down transformer is a large electrical device that converts
high-voltage power produced by the ship’s diesel generators into lower 440-volt power. This
transformer and its circuity and breakers had long suffered the effects of heavy vibrations, a
well-known cause of transformer and electrical failure. Instead of taking steps to eliminate the
source of excessive vibrations, Petitioners jury-rigged their ship. They retrofitted the transformer
with anti-vibration braces, one of which had cracked over time, had been repaired with welds,
and had cracked again. And they also wedged a metal cargo hook be
tween the transformer and a nearby steel beam, in a makeshift attempt to limit vibration.
5. These telltale signs of vibration problems were not isolated. The ship’s previous chief
officer reported that “constant vibrations” above the engine room were shaking loose the ship’s
cargo lashings. Engineers noted that these problems were cracking equipment in the engine
room. A prior captain wrote that “heavy vibration[s]” at certain speeds had been reported to
Synergy, the technical manager of the vessel. Accordingly, it should have come as no surprise
when the circuit breakers to the transformer tripped due to loose and damaged circuitry.
6. With the failure at the number 1 step-down transformer, all power stopped flowing to the
ship’s 440-volt electrical panel. The bridge and engine room went completely dark, the crew
could not steer, and the main engine stopped, which caused the propeller to stop turning. At that
point, the power should have transferred automatically to the backup number 2 step-down
transformer within just a few seconds, while there was still ample time to steer away from the
bridge. But this automation, a safety feature tailor made for the occasion at hand, had been
recklessly disabled. The engineers were left struggling in the dark to manually reset the tripped
circuit breakers for the number 1 step-down transformer. This took them a full minute, wasting
critical time to regain control of the ship.
7. In the interim, the DALI’s emergency generator also should have turned on automatically
and restored power so that the ship could be steered. Maritime regulations require this to happen
within 45 seconds. But it did not. Instead, well over a minute passed from the original blackout
before the emergency generator provided power to the helm—more time wasted.
8. When power was finally returned to the helm, the pilot, even though still without a
working propeller, began issuing orders to steer the ship under the center span of the bridge.
Had the engineers successfully restored the main engine and propeller to working order, the pilot
would have had greater control over the ship, including the ability to slow down. But that never
happened. Instead, about a minute after regaining power, the DALI lost power a second time.
9. This second power failure was caused by Petitioners’ decision—made to save money and
for their own convenience—to use a “flushing” pump to fuel the diesel generators that made the
ship’s electricity. Unlike proper fuel pumps, this pump was designed to be used only for the
temporary task of “flushing” out a pipeline when switching between different types of fuel. It
was not designed to recover automatically from a blackout, a critical safety feature of the proper
fuel pumps that the DALI should have been using.
10. As a consequence, after the first blackout, the flushing pump turned off and stayed off.
At that point, the diesel generators received fuel only via a small emergency pneumatic (airdriven)
pump, which was not capable of providing enough fuel pressure to continuously run the
diesel generators. Starved of fuel, those engines began to slow down, leading the ship’s
computer to disconnect them from the electrical switchboards. That dealt the pilot and crew a
second blackout.
11. Facing a dire situation, but still two minutes from impact, the Maryland pilot gave an
emergency order for the DALI to release the port (left) anchor in the hopes of pulling the vessel
away from the bridge. But because the DALI’s anchor was not ready for immediate release in an
emergency, as required by law, nothing happened. By the time the ship finally dropped anchor,
less than half a ship’s length from the bridge, it was too late to have any effect.
12. Finally, and while still waiting on the anchor, the pilot gave an order to apply full power
to the bow thruster in a last-ditch attempt to push the ship away from the bridge. When nothing
happened, the pilot was told the bow thruster was unavailable.
13. At approximately 1:28 a.m., the DALI slammed into one of the Francis Scott Key Bridge
support piers, causing several sections of the bridge to fall into the Patapsco River. Six people
were killed, two more injured, and two critical components of the United States’ transportation
infrastructure—the highway and channel—were taken out of service. In response, the United
States provided workforce, vessels, equipment, and technical expertise necessary to remove the
DALI, Francis Scott Key Bridge remnants, and other debris from the Fort McHenry Channel. As
work progressed, the United States established and maintained temporary navigational channels
to allow some access to the Port of Baltimore. All told, it took months to restore the Fort
McHenry Channel and reopen the port to its normal capacity, and it will take years to build a
new bridge. The Baltimore region continues to feel the adverse impacts of this entirely
avoidable tragedy.
14. The ship’s owner and manager—who now ask the Court to limit their liability to less than
$44 million—sent an ill-prepared crew on an abjectly unseaworthy vessel to navigate the United
States’ waterways. They did so to reap the benefit of conducting business in American ports.
Yet they cut corners in ways that risked lives and infrastructure. Those responsible for the vessel
must be held fully accountable for the catastrophic harm they caused, and punitive damages
should be imposed to deter such misconduct.

It goes on for 53 pages!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

[j.sabourn]

#4 I don’t know the harbour rules for the port of Baltimore , but in my time at sea it was usually up to the master to have his permission for the hire of tugs and as soon as a line was given to a tug then the higher charges started . In the case of a port under Naval Control he would have to do as told . on a river transit it was always prudent to have an anchor cleared for dropping and a man standing by for to release in an emergency. It doesn’t take electrical power to drop an anchor. I think that the American authority’s will win their case for astronomical costs and blame will be put on ship and those manning it , particularly the master. All the senior officers will be pinpointed to be in error one way or another , even the OLB in all the drills run on the ship will be suspect. If I was a betting man there will be a number of seafarers looking for jobs already and finding hard to get. Youse pays your money and takes your chance , there is always fall guys , most seafarers know that and if not they aren’t real sailormen. Cheers JS

[James Curry]

On LNG carriers while in transit into port or a river passage and especially Tokyo bay tugs emplyed either attached or as escort no options given them was the rules. When entering port particularly Barcelona nothing moved until we were all fast alongside. Mind you in those days at least until 2010 the Spanish seemed to think it was okay to have an LNG gas terminal now on in the middle of a city. One place in Spain the discharge pipline went under the main road , not sure but it may have been Cartagena.
I do remember a time when discharging Ammonia the discharge line from the jetty to the storage tanks ruptured, mad panic ensued when the ESD was tripped. Thankfully the gas cloud was now back towards the ship. I would imagine anyone near that fractured pipe not wearing BA or at least an ammonia mask was in serious trouble. Couple of lung fulls of that and it is good night.

[Tony Taylor]

On LNG carriers while in transit into port or a river passage and especially Tokyo bay tugs emplyed either attached or as escort no options given them was the rules. When entering port particularly Barcelona nothing moved until we were all fast alongside. Mind you in those days at least until 2010 the Spanish seemed to think it was okay to have an LNG gas terminal now on in the middle of a city. One place in Spain the discharge pipline went under the main road , not sure but it may have been Cartagena.
I do remember a time when discharging Ammonia the discharge line from the jetty to the storage tanks ruptured, mad panic ensued when the ESD was tripped. Thankfully the gas cloud was now back towards the ship. I would imagine anyone near that fractured pipe not wearing BA or at least an ammonia mask was in serious trouble. Couple of lung fulls of that and it is good night.

I've not done LNG since 1978, but I seem to recall that you were not supposed to maneouvre on gas boil off in Tokyo Bay, but the alternative was to vent boil off?
Am not saying what we did but am sure we didnt vent.

[James Curry]

When I was with BP I did a spell on the Northwest Shearwater we always stayed on gas and we were running into Tokyo bay, Negishi, Ohgishima, Higashi, Sedegaura and Futtsu. Bloody hell if you went over onto Fuel oil the Chief engineer was nearly having duck eggs. Reason was as she was always loading out of Karratha getting fuel oil bunkers was extremely expensive and difficult. On the BP Trader class LNG Carriers membrane tanks the tank pressures would creep up as the trip trough the bay was slow. Also because I had to cool down the lines it was increasing the tank pressures. The number of rows I had with the Chief Engineer because he would not dump steam through the condensoras he moaned about the loss of condensate. Only way I could get this guy to cooperate was to threaten to dump vapour, usually a word with the mate or oldman did the trick. Never sailed on LNG Motor ships so not sure how they fair there,but I think they are fitted with reliquefaction plant.