M.v. Derbyshire

[Glenn Nicholas]

I Twenty years of research is enough to have added safety measures, it's a disgusting time period and exhausting wait to upgrade merchant vessels, however.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=XTEjRkTsjdw

I actually rewatched this documentary about how quickly it went down, it's quite remarkable and terrifying to say I had an out of body experience and dreamed the exact same thing the other night.

It's pretty stupid to say this now after the sinking, but the way it works, carrying 160,000 tons and navigating through the eye of a storm—indeed, a cyclone—with a captain who can't see the bow, let alone its length, which doesn't allow even a pair of binoculars to see that the ship wasn't fully there at any point.

Even a competent sailor should be able to say now, "Look, let the storm calm down until it passes."
It's a sign of those times. Captain must keep schedule regardless upon the weather conditions. I'm surprised anyone was willing to set sail after this, let alone that they didn't lobby the IMO to compile pilot control to replace the crew below decks since this happened.

Now, let's suppose someone refused to cross the ship's path and didn't want to follow the captain's orders, so they were arrested on board. However, because they were blinded during the storm, the place of arrest was the bow of the ship. At least there the crew could have figured out what was happening, as the out-of-body experience tested the ship's integrity.

What we witnessed is either a negligent crew or a suggestion. What was needed in this case was for the captain to personally report or call the chief engineer on watch and request that these rounds be completed every hour, as it was an essential requirement.

This indicates that the engineering department had more power than the bridge department, so the manpower controlled the engine room, so the captain was not a force to be reckoned with and had complete control of his ship. Another point worth highlighting is the responsibility of the fourth engineer or junior engineer on watch, or the motorman, and also the wiper, to perform hourly water integrity checks in each compartment. It's worth mentioning that I don't believe the forward spaces were checked even throughout the storm.
What usually happens between the engineer and the fourth engineer, or at least in the third engineer's communications area, given that it's a tough competition of minds to advance, is that the engineer on watch is someone who should be chosen for the fourth or junior engineer. Even better, the engineer's job!
I've reviewed the crew list, so there's good news: there's a crew member who meets double the requirements for every position on board, including day and night watches. However, engineer rounds are exhaustive, and long watches often occur, as the remaining hours of fatigue and silence override work ethic or engineering standards.
The message to address any captain is the engineering pecking order among ranks to detail the chief engineer, who would have a competent crew under his name, to a wiper, an engineer's mate or motorman, and a fourth engineer as a junior engineer. Ideally, when the age is selectively older and more mature, and/or the smarter junior engineer, to split the difference of four into double the junior engineers and fourth engineer. But technically speaking, they are all fourth engineers or junior engineers. The junior engineer primarily reports to a first and second engineer, with the fourth engineer working below the third engineer. I am not detailing the ins and outs of being a third engineer; however, the duty of the third engineer is the toughest job aboard a ship; he handles the engineering of the watches. Note that the work ethic is not suited to the personal goal of the previous version of engineering, as he hastily produced the worst of his behaviour to communicate less with the fourth engineer.
I don't know much about the engineer officers of the 1980s: were they British or did they speak English as a second language? I disagree with the latter, as the engine room was quite old-fashioned for British crew, although it was the exception: the lower ranks, so-called General Purpose 1, were made their way in the following decade. Otherwise, were the other crew members ****** and Malaysian? I doubt they were part of this engineering team.

I would also like to point out, in relation to the strange accident, that the third engineer had died several years earlier, indicating that activities in the engine room may not have been satisfactory for working in order.

I don't know, but since they were records and that was engineering, they found nothing more than what the deck officers said, which reveals who was responsible for the sinking.[disaster]

[James Curry]

Glenn, when you say the engine room was old fashioned ? the ship was only 4 years old when she sank.
She was the victim because of 3 factors, Weather, Poor design and probably the most likely cause was poor build quality. One only has to look at the histories of the sister vessels from the builders.

Also why would you be under the impression that it is an engineering responsiblity to check forward spaces for water integrity?
There would have been or should have been in the forward spaces like the Bosuns store a high level bilge alarm. That alarm would have sounded either on the bridge or the Cargo control room perhaps the engineroom as well?

Another point worth highlighting is the responsibility of the fourth engineer or junior engineer on watch, or the motorman, and also the wiper, to perform hourly water integrity checks in each compartment. It's worth mentioning that I don't believe the forward spaces were checked even throughout the storm.

I do not understand your reasoning here. Apart from fuel bunker tanks any tanks outside the engineroom space is the responsibility of the Deck Department. The engineering department may well have operated the ballast pumps as per the C/Off requirements.
Cargo space and ballast tanks are the responsibility for monitoring by the Bosun or bosuns mate and the soundings would have been recorded in the Soundings book, which would have been kept on the Bridge.

Also in weather like that it would have been suicide for any crew member to venture forward so what is this Arrested refer to?

The crew on the Derbyshire were British. The loss of m/v Derbyshire 42 crew (2) wives to date is the highest loss of British seafarers in a peace time maritime accident.

poignant-monument.jpg

I have visited this memorial many times and it never fails to bring a tear to my eye, I worked for Bibby's for 7 or 8 years.

[Ivan Cloherty]

Even a competent sailor should be able to say now, "Look, let the storm calm down until it passes."

After being in Hurricanes, Typhoons and cyclones I don't quite understand what that means.

Also I find some of the comments at variance with reality. No Master of a 'Bulk Carrier' would place his vessel in danger to keep a schedule, bulk carriers as such didn't have schedules as such, they perhaps had 'Laydays' to meet when heading for a loading port, but these laydays could span a period of 7 - 14 days in the Charter party.

I am not surprised that the Naval Architects were surprised that a small airvent could let in so much water, never will a simulation tank ever be able to simulate what happens in reality, those of us have been in these conditions in actuality have often uttered the words 'I wish the barstewards who had designed this cow could be aboard now to see how it really is'. We have often seen our bow along with #1 hatch disappear between the waves and muttered come-on girl you can do it.

No two storms are the same, no matter what Beaufort numbers or categories you give them, and I have a feeling that the documentary was made for sensationalism rather than fact.

Some of the statements made show no reality aboutshipboard heirachy and responsibilities.

FWE.

[j.sabourn]

#13 I was master on a Norwegian seismic vessel on the NW shelf area Ivan ,We had a Securitay call that a cyclone was expected to be in our area of search within 24 hours , I told the the charterers rep. to be prepared within the next 6 hrs. To be prepared to pull in the 5 arrays we towed astern for 3 miles . He quibbled about coming off site so I said right I’ve given you 6 hrs notice as of now if that gears is still out I leave the area a bit earlier and it comes with us at 4 knots . So I did what I said I would do , you don’t ride cyclones out you try and get into the safe quadrant , which is easy to remember in the southern hemisphere all you have to remember the safe quadrant in this case is not where the monkey sticks it’s nuts but in the right hand upper quadrant which on an imaginary seaman’s right buttock is the same place you stick a penicillin injection , today however is not penicillin but streptomycin as penicillin has passed its usefulness by becoming almost immune to tropical Diseases that’s putting it nicely. The master that followed me listened to this font of knowledge in a similar situation and stayed on station and lost all the towing assemblies costing hundreds of thousands of dollars and guess who carried the can. Cheers JS…….

[Glenn Nicholas]

[A lot to say about the fourth engineer]

Twenty years of research is enough to have added safety measures, it's a disgusting time period and exhausting wait to upgrade merchant vessels, however.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=XTEjRkTsjdw

I actually rewatched this documentary about how quickly it went down, it's quite remarkable and terrifying to say I had an out of body experience and dreamed the exact same thing the other night.

It's pretty stupid to say this now after the sinking, but the way it works, carrying 160,000 tons and navigating through the eye of a storm—indeed, a cyclone—with a captain who can't see the bow, let alone its length, which doesn't allow even a pair of binoculars to see that the ship wasn't fully there at any point.

Even a competent sailor should be able to say now, "Look, let the storm calm down until it passes."
It's a sign of those times. Captain must keep schedule regardless upon the weather conditions. I'm surprised anyone was willing to set sail after this, let alone that they didn't lobby the IMO to compile pilot control to replace the crew below decks since this happened.

Now, let's suppose someone refused to cross the ship's path and didn't want to follow the captain's orders, so they were arrested on board. However, because they were blinded during the storm, the place of arrest was the bow of the ship. At least there the crew could have figured out what was happening, as the out-of-body experience tested the ship's integrity.

What we witnessed is either a negligent crew or a suggestion. What was needed in this case was for the captain to personally report or call the chief engineer on watch and request that these rounds be completed every hour, as it was an essential requirement.

This indicates that the engineering department had more power than the bridge department, so the manpower controlled the engine room, so the captain was not a force to be reckoned with and had complete control of his ship. Another point worth highlighting is the responsibility of the fourth engineer or junior engineer on watch, or the motorman, and also the wiper, to perform hourly water integrity checks in each compartment. It's worth mentioning that I don't believe the forward spaces were checked even throughout the storm.
What usually happens between the engineer and the fourth engineer, or at least in the third engineer's communications area, given that it's a tough competition of minds to advance, is that the engineer on watch is someone who should be chosen for the fourth or junior engineer. Even better, the engineer's job!
I've reviewed the crew list, so there's good news: there's a crew member who meets double the requirements for every position on board, including day and night watches. However, engineer rounds are exhaustive, and long watches often occur, as the remaining hours of fatigue and silence override work ethic or engineering standards.
The message to address any captain is the engineering pecking order among ranks to detail the chief engineer, who would have a competent crew under his name, to a wiper, an engineer's mate or motorman, and a fourth engineer as a junior engineer. Ideally, when the age is selectively older and more mature, and/or the smarter junior engineer, to split the difference of four into double the junior engineers and fourth engineer. But technically speaking, they are all fourth engineers or junior engineers. The junior engineer primarily reports to a first and second engineer, with the fourth engineer working below the third engineer. I am not detailing the ins and outs of being a third engineer; however, the duty of the third engineer is the toughest job aboard a ship; he handles the engineering of the watches. Note that the work ethic is not suited to the personal goal of the previous version of engineering, as he hastily produced the worst of his behaviour to communicate less with the fourth engineer. In my opinion, the fourth engineer is a bit slower than his classmates; in fact, the officers won't be able to conduct engineering or even speak, as he has too much to do to maintain a similar level of communication. The biggest fear is that, when the fourth engineer can't discuss his grievances or complaints, he'll neglect his rounds or venture off on them alone. Therefore, his presence must be noticed, in this case, by the deck officers, or like the fourth-class officer, who has seen enough dark matter in the engines to still maintain the ship's integrity, and clear the air as the only other option is to be the informant. The fourth engineer takes his place beneath the captains.

I don't know much about the engineer officers of the 1980s: were they British or did they speak English as a second language? I disagree with the latter, as the engine room mentality was quite old-fashioned for British crew, although it was the exception: the lower ranks, so-called General Purpose 1, were made their way in the following decade. Otherwise, were the other crew members ****** and Malaysian? I doubt they were part of this engineering team.

I would also like to point out, in relation to the strange accident, that the third engineer had died several years earlier, indicating that activities in the engine room may not have been satisfactory for working in order.

I don't know, but since they were records and that was engineering, they found nothing more than what the deck officers said, which reveals who was responsible for the sinking.[disaster][/QUOTE]

[Ivan Cloherty]

[a lot to say about the fourth engineer]

, however. i actually rewatched this documentary about how quickly it went down,]

[/quote]

No matter how careful a shipmaster you are, ships can drive themselves down ,when they catch successive waves wrong, and you have no control over rogue waves, which appear out of nowhere, as in the case of the Berg Istra (a vessel larger than the Derbyshire) many moons ago. A master caught in a typhoon would have hove-to his vessel at around 3 - 4 knots to maintain steerage way and have steered into the seas in a quadrant of the compass that made his vessel ride as comfortably as possible, the last thing on his mind would be schedules or sending anyone out on deck.

Rogue waves are very prevalent even though Naval Architects and their mathematical modelling in earlier years told them that they could not possibly exist, and ridiculed the idea, those of us at sea knew better, and the advent of satellite trackings proved that they were not figments of our imagination

I cannot understand this obsession with a fourth engineer

[Glenn Nicholas]

Thank you, James Curry, for your comments.

The shipwright cannot be sufficiently responsible for the ship's design, and the high market value of raw materials in these factors played against the constant hardships and work pressures imposed on employees, who were no longer within their reach. The scale of shipbuilding, however, is impressive, but due to the previous model-maker's and free labour movement, it was declared inadmissible at the beginning of the merchant shipping monopoly. Accidents do occur due to this fact. I agree that the factors causing failure, and therefore the labour force, can be greater than the gross cargo. I wish, among the extensive family legacy still present on Tyneside, included the tradition of building ships in wooden versions. At least, the shipwright's design was his. Nevertheless, the Swan Hunters shipyard has a long history of shipbuilding and naval integrity; Of course, the time of decline of the shipwright, sadly, came during the Thatcher government.

The bow spaces are everyone's responsibility; however, the fourth engineer might need to perform additional drills, so the engineer officer prepares for his task before handover in the event of impending bad weather. Therefore, the communications area is vital to the bridge. I wasn't alive during this disaster and the safety precautions involved during this voyage. However, it makes sense that navigating through unfamiliar waves takes the following into account: for starters, crew members below decks might fasten their seatbelts, but let the cameras and infrared sensors do all the work. It's a terrifying experience, especially for the fourth engineer on duty, who might be alone on his rounds.

I don't know if others do this, but a good crew member is vigilant, diligent, attentive to their surroundings, and active on patrol. What Christian was supposed to investigate was the work of Mother Nature. I have great respect for all those merchant marine crew members. Whoever has the task will approach the captain and make a big deal out of their arrest. It's about listening to the developing scenario and how the wind is blowing, and trying to change the direction with their forecasts. After all, nature tells crew members something fresher than keeping the lights clear. Again, I'm not saying this was bad naval company; we're just learning from human error. Sadly, the coffin ships... I could say much more about this disaster, but I won't.

Glenn, when you say the engine room was old fashioned ? the ship lowas only 4 years old when she sank.
She was the victim because of 3 factors, Weather, Poor design and probably the most likely cause was poor build quality. One only has to look at the histories of the sister vessels from the builders.

Also why would you be under the impression that it is an engineering responsiblity to check forward spaces for water integrity?
There would have been or should have been in the forward spaces like the Bosuns store a high level bilge alarm. That alarm would have sounded either on the bridge or the Cargo control room perhaps the engineroom as well?

Another point worth highlighting is the responsibility of the fourth engineer or junior engineer on watch, or the motorman, and also the wiper, to perform hourly water integrity checks in each compartment. It's worth mentioning that I don't believe the forward spaces were checked even throughout the storm.

I do not understand your reasoning here. Apart from fuel bunker tanks any tanks outside the engineroom space is the responsibility of the Deck Department. The engineering department may well have operated the ballast pumps as per the C/Off requirements.
Cargo space and ballast tanks are the responsibility for monitoring by the Bosun or bosuns mate and the soundings would have been recorded in the Soundings book, which would have been kept on the Bridge.

Also in weather like that it would have been suicide for any crew member to venture forward so what is this Arrested refer to?

The crew on the Derbyshire were British. The loss of m/v Derbyshire 42 crew (2) wives to date is the highest loss of British seafarers in a peace time maritime accident.

poignant-monument.jpg

I have visited this memorial many times and it never fails to bring a tear to my eye, I worked for Bibby's for 7 or 8 years.

[Ivan Cloherty]

Thank you, James Curry, for your comments.

(AAA)
The shipwright cannot be sufficiently responsible for the ship's design, Of course, the time of decline of the shipwright, sadly, came during the Thatcher government.

(BBB)
The bow spaces are everyone's responsibility; however, the fourth engineer might need to perform additional drills, so the engineer officer prepares for his task before handover in the event of impending bad weather. Therefore, the communications area is vital to the bridge. I wasn't alive during this disaster and the safety precautions involved during this voyage. However, it makes sense that navigating through unfamiliar waves takes the following into account: for starters, crew members below decks might fasten their seatbelts, but let the cameras and infrared sensors do all the work. It's a terrifying experience, especially for the fourth engineer on duty, who might be alone on his rounds.


(CCC)
I could say much more about this disaster, but I won't

.

(AAA)

A shipwright had nothing to do with a vessels design, that was the factor for the naval architect. A shipwright was there during the build to assist in supervising the building practices in that particular yard and was time served (normally five years) under the guidance of previously qualified shipwrights and spent many months in the 'Loft' with Naval Architects as part of his trade. To blame Thatcher for the demise of a shipwright bears no fact to reality, you must look further back than that to the Wilson era and the Kenya Agreement.

(BBB) 'Fasten their seatbelts' I am assuming that this is a figure of speech and not something you think really happens. What makes you think that vessels (if any) were fitted with cameras and infra red sensors in that era
and let them do all the work.

'The BOW Spaces are everyone's responsibility' really!!!

'The 4/E may need to perform additional tasks before impending bad weather' The 4/E would have followed the instructions of the C/E and 2/E in any duties performed and would have had no influence in any decision making. Don't forget the 4/E on any vessel may be a first tripper and would still be learning the intracies of that vessel.

(CCC) I'll keep my thoughts to myself. Perhaps I am missing the point of these latest postings

[Glenn Nicholas]

The merchant marine follower is probably the best in the communications expert's record.

But I wasn't capable enough to be a fourth engineer in the first place, let alone in this first grade. I stunned them. The physics department paved the way for me to comment on it. On the other hand, my teachings came from Tyneside, and ancient essays said: worker beware.

You call the largest vessel at amber speed going through a similar dilemma. And the first officer in this case, from your point of view, I had before registered a speed of 8-9 knots. He should have been attended to before the engine readings, which were supposed to indicate a speed greater than that. No go go area. So, was the tolerance reading a dead end or a bad experience of the ship based on the horizon of a rogue wave?

A quadrant angle less than the heading of this beast occurs than normal in the Northern Hemisphere, causing it to deviate from Mother Nature's pattern, which it turns directly toward.

It was agreed. We were watching the MV Derbyshire sink to the bottom of the Dead Sea. Quickly, it's said, she sinks after failing to find a submarine in the area, and she spends an all-nighter, and the jump to England is made. The biggest naval vessel to sank. There's no rescue attempt, sir, to that black, enclosed space—yes, an empty space to the tin can's exposure. But it's astonishing that the out-of-body experience of this dream, occurring in the milliseconds of waking up, or imploding, frying whatever comes first, wasn't the reason I called, due to the amount of physics that repeats itself over and over again, such is the nature of maritime warfare today.

The fourth engineer sent a big salute to the captain of industry, Tyneside.

[Johnny Kieran]

I haven't watched the video, but surely a laden ship of that shape is more likely to break up during a storm than the usual shaped ships. If you get a piece of steel and keep bending it, before long it's going to crack then snap. The longer it is, the easier it'll fail.
I've been on a ship that was in a storm for days on end. A derrick crutch snapped off at the base causing all kinds of mayhem for us deck crew. Then when calm seas were reached, it was noticed that a long line of paint free steel was visible in the deck from one side to the other, just like when you bend a strip of steel too often. This was in the same area as the dodgy derrick.
It was reported, but nothing came of it. Some of the older hands made a fuss about it, but it was soon forgotten.
I heard some years later, that the ship (sold off by then) sank with all hands lost.
You can just imagine shipping them green day after day, with the bow under the sea and the stern wanting to drop but can't. Or the **** end deep, and the bow wanting to drop, but held up by a wave amidships.
I remember going on the wheel at 12 midday and the skipper telling us to try a course change, just a few points to starboard. That lasted about half a minute, so it was back into the sea, and clearing up everything smashed around the ship. I never lived it down from the other blokes when I came off watch.
Think I posted a bit about that event some time ago, so apologies for boring you all again.