Dangerous Bulk Carriers.

[John Arton]

Following on from the loss of the Stellar Daisy, this happened.
MV STELLAR DAISY Loss Casts Shadow Over Fleet of Vale Iron-Ore Carriers – gCaptain
rgds
JA

[Ivan Cloherty]

Following on from the loss of the Stellar Daisy, this happened.
MV STELLAR DAISY Loss Casts Shadow Over Fleet of Vale Iron-Ore Carriers – gCaptain
rgds
JA

Every Naval Architect should be made to sail on the ships they have designed, no amount of 'mathematical modelling' on computers or in test tanks can replicate what mother nature throws at you, experiencing mother nature at its rawest would make them think twice before cutting one single piece of steel on another vessel

[Jim Dixon]

The structural integrity of Iron Ore carriers have always been in question. In the smaller, handysize, alternative hold loading did not raise its head although the loading rate did. There were many ports in the 60s capable of loading close to 10k per/hr. Enter the Cape sizes and ports starting loading inxs of 10k per/hr. Some ports in the 70s, particularly in S.America were close to 15k per hour. The fast loading and shippers eagerness to cut dispatch time pushed terminals into loading alternative holds. The stresses induced by at actual dynamic loading rate during the actual loading and the subsequent stresses on the ship on the loaded passage due alternate hold loading hardly bears thinking about. Without apportioning blame it might help if Ore Carriers were loading in all holds thereby having uniform stress throughout.
I am not a fan of these ships as you can see.

Jim D.

[happy daze john in oz]

Many of thses bulk carriers are very sluggish when it comes to high seas and attempting to turn them takes a longer time than many smaller ships.
The iron ore carriers out of WA can testify to that as a number of them have at times been in trouble.

[Colin Wood]

Quite agree. Having been a Draught surveyor loading coal for over 20 years, the problem of bending stresses worried me. This was especially when vessels were loading cargo at a number of ports. On 1 occasion, had a 9 hatch bulky loading at 6 different ports.
The other worry was that although a loading plan was submitted, the terminals just loaded at full speed with no regard for the discharge of ballast and would black list ships if they had the loading stopped.
I did discuss this with AMSA surveyors who advised that unless I could provide documentary proof, there was nothing they could do.
As regards the Derbyshire, this class was renowned for the getting hold cracks and I think a number of the class either sank or were run aground because of this problem.

[j.sabourn]

I have already put a previous post up similar to what is being discussed. It cost me my job when I wasn't listened to re the real danger on being loaded like we did. However it was on my own behalf I resigned. They wanted to promote me to master which I refused. At least years ago the master seemed to have more authority as to safety than one does today as the loading plans are done today more than ever ashore. A lot of bad loading is done through plain ignorance and lack of experience by what I saw before I retired. I was in the main lucky as mate as sailed mostly with masters who would back me up on any stowage plan I put forward, and only two exceptions to this when I was mate. Both ships I left of my own accord. JWS.

[John Arton]

I was Chief Officer on a number of Japanese built Cape sized bulkers in the late 70's loading coal, iron ore in Richards Bay, Tuberao,Seven Islands, Port Hedland
Richards Bay was not too bad, it would take 24 hours or more to load 122,000 tons but Tubarao and Seven Islands were a nightmare. In order to prevent getting tossed off the berth because your deballasting rate was far less than the loading rate, you had to go alongside with minimum ballast in the ship with stress's just within the still water bending moments. In Tubarao they had two loaders each capable of 15,000 t.p.h. loading rates so you loaded at an average rate of 20,000 t.p.h., yet the ballast pumps could only discharge ballast at around 4000 t.p.h., Seven Isles would have around 10,000 tons of iron ore in you before you had even completed mooring. The Cape Sized vessels always had one hold designated as a ballast hold so when loading Iron Ore we always loaded alternate holds so as the ballast hold was not included. Coal (Power stations fines) required all holds to be loaded but as said, I loaded that in Richards Bay with only one loader that did around 7,000 t.p.h. so ballasting was not a problem, plus we often got delays as in those days the rail trains bringing the coal in often derailed on a bend as they neared the port and there was not a huge stockpile of coal waiting to be shipped.
The discharge ports were Antwerp, Le Havre, Dunkirk and Rotterdam and in nearly all of them we entered with minimum under keel clearance on the berth and had to start ballasting almost immediately in order to fit under the discharging cranes. This meant that mud build up in the ballast tanks was a major problem and on one Cape Sized our constant was in excess of 1000 tons due to the build up of mud. In a slump in trade she was laid up in the Philippine's for a couple of months when well over a 1,000 tons of mud was dug out of the ballast tanks which led to the discovery of such wastage of the frames etc. in those tanks, she was sent for scrap early. On another sister ship the hull flexing that the ship was subjected to when loading was such that a ballast line dresser coupling sprang apart, flooding the duct keel leading to a 72 hour off hire spell whilst we could arrange salvage pumps to pump out the duct keel and repair the coupling.
rgds
JA

[cappy]

###could be the french wine lol cappy

[Lewis McColl]

Ivan if you are going to pass a comment on a post do complete the statement as in (Guess who was in power at the time of the sinking and at the time of the eventual inquiry)

[John Arton]

Did the Official inquiry into the Derbyshire sinking not put the blame on the failure of No.1 hatch covers? I know that after the results of that inquiry Classification societies upgraded the strength requirements of large bulk carrier hatch covers.
I did my Mates ticket with a lad who had been cadet on the Tyne Bridge's maiden voyage and even on sea trials she suffered fractures in the main deck plating, starting from the hatch corners, this was something I experienced when I joined as Mate a 105,000 OBO that had been built in Japan.
The Haverton Hill yard was building those vessels using modern block section construction but using old equipment that was not suitable for such methods. My next door neighbour in our first house had actually worked in that yard on the bridge vessels and he told me anyone who sailed on them was taking their life in their hands as often it was almost impossible to line the sections up correctly so welding rods were put in the gaps to fill them before they were welded together.
They were also built flush decked with little or no raised focsle to provide any protection to no.1 hatch and initially the inquiry attempted to blame crew failure when they saw on the video, the hatch to the rope store on the focsle that appeared to have been incorrectly secured, this was later discounted. The Japanese Cape sized bulkers I sailed on hatch covers were side opening slabs that were pretty strongly constructed but also had the added protection of a raised focsle along with deck houses between alternate hatches.
rgds
JA
p.s. correct it was the Kowloon Bridge that suffered hull failure off Ireland.